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Abstract
We study an environment where the capital structure of banks and rms are jointly
determined in equilibrium, so as to balance the benets of the provision of liquidity
services by bank deposits with the costs of bankruptcy. The risk in the assets held
by rms and banks is determined by the technology choices by rms and the portfolio
diversication choices by banks. We show competitive equilibria are e¢ cient and the
equilibrium level of leverage in banks and rms depend on the nature of the shocks
a¤ecting rm productivities. When these shocks are co-monotonic, banks optimally
choose a zero level of equity. Thus all equity should be in rms, where it does double
duty,protecting both rms and banks from default. On the other hand, if productivity
shocks have an idiosyncratic component, portfolio diversication by banks may be a
more e¤ective bu¤er against these shocks and, in these cases, it may be optimal for
banks, as well as rms, to issue equity.
1 Introduction
The Financial Crisis of 2007-08 started a vigorous debate about the regulation of the banking
system, much of it focused on bank capital regulation. It is widely accepted that capital
adequacy regulation in the pre-crisis period did not ensure that banks had su¢ cient capital
to weather the storm. The risk weights used under Basel II underestimated the risk of certain
asset classes and regulatory arbitrage further reduced its e¤ectiveness. In response, regulators
at both the national and international level have sought to introduce more stringent capital
adequacy requirements.
Although new policies are already being put in place, our theoretical understanding of the
role of bank capital lags behind. What is the market failure that requires capital regulation?
We are grateful to Franklin Allen and Cyril Monnet for very helpful comments. We thank the participants
at seminars and conferences at New York University, Cambridge University, the University of Essex, The
House of Finance in Stockholm, the Copenhagen Business School, Impa and UCLA for their comments and
questions.
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What role do capital requirements play in the corporate governance of large and complex
banks? What are the costs of regulation, directly in the form of compliance costs and
indirectly in the form of distortions of economic decisions?
Capital regulation has its roots in bank supervision, which traditionally focuses on the
safety and soundnessof individual banks. Not surprisingly, recent proposals for increasing
the stability of the nancial system are simply stronger versions of the policies aimed at
insuring the resilience of individual banks. Similarly, much of the theoretical literature on
capital regulation focuses on the behavior of individual banks, rather than the nancial
system. This is unfortunate, because macroprudential regulation is concerned with the
stability of the nancial system as a whole. It requires an understanding of systemic risk,
as distinct from the risk of individual banks. In addition, capital regulation may have
macroeconomic e¤ects. For example, a global increase in bank capital will have an e¤ect
on the cost of capital. Finally, stability is not the only objective of nancial regulation. Its
objectives should include an e¢ cient, innovative, and competitive nancial system. This
requires an understanding of the welfare economics of regulation.
For all these reasons, we take the view that a general equilibrium approach is needed.
A useful starting point is to identify the conditions under which laisser-faire equilibrium is
e¢ cient, as a precursor to identifying the market failures that makes regulation necessary
and the distortions that may be introduced by regulation.
Admati and Hellwig (2013) have argued that the seminal Modigliani and Miller (1958)
paper on capital structure should be the starting point for any discussion of capital regulation.
We agree that Modigliani and Miller (1958) is the cornerstone of the literature on corporate
capital structure, but an explanation of the determinants of bank capital structure cannot be
restricted to the environment considered by Modigliani and Miller. In analyzing the capital
structure of banks, it is important to recognize their role as intermediaries, as well as the
fact that bank deposits are not simply debt claims, but are also valued by agents because
they function as money. In this paper, we assume that deposits are used for transactions
and this function gives rise to a spread between the returns on equity and deposits. At the
same time, the higher a banks debt, the higher the probability and hence the cost of its
default.1
Unlike the Modigliani-Miller model, in which capital structure is irrelevant, in our model
capital structure matters. A banks equilibrium capital structure is determined by a trade-o¤
between the funding advantage of deposits and the possibility of costly default2. In addition,
the role of banks as intermediaries creates a link between the capital structure of banks and
the capital structure of the rms that borrow from the banks. The higher rmsleverage,
the riskier their debt, and the higher the probability of bank default, other things being
equal. This interdependence between the capital structures in the corporate sector and the
banking sector is a major theme of this paper.
1We assume that when a bank fails, because it is unable to meet the demand for withdrawals, a fraction
of the value of its assets is lost.
2A similar trade-o¤ arises in models of optimal capital structure where the rm balances the tax advan-
tages of debt and the costs of default.
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In this paper we study a representative agent economy consisting of consumers, rms
and banks. Consumers have an initial endowment of capital goods and want consumption
goods. Firms have access to a variety of risky technologies that use capital goods to produce
consumption goods. Firms issue equity to households and borrow from banks in order to
fund the purchase of capital goods. Banks lend to rms and issue equity and deposits to
households to fund their loan portfolios. Households purchase equity in rms and make
deposits in banks to fund their future consumption. Only banks can lend to rms and only
households can invest in equity.
Firms and banks are restricted in the securities they can issue. Firms are restricted to
issuing debt and equity and banks are restricted to taking deposits and issuing equity. In
this sense, markets are incomplete. Nonetheless, the set of potential securities that can be
issued is large, because rms and banks can make di¤erent choices regarding technologies
(in the case of rms), loan portfolios (in the case of banks), and capital structures (in the
case of both rms and banks). These choices a¤ect the risk characteristics of the securities
issued by banks and rms and result in a large array of potential securities being priced and
traded. We assume markets for these potential securities are competitive and complete, in
the sense that there is a market and a market-clearing price for each type of security that
could be issued.
In this framework, we obtain analogues of the fundamental theorems of welfare economics.
First, we show that a competitive equilibrium, where rms and banks maximize their market
value, is constrained e¢ cient.3 Second, we show that any constrained e¢ cient allocation can
be decentralized4 as an equilibrium.5 Although these results are counterparts of the usual
welfare theorems, the assumptions are demanding. In this framework, both rms and banks
are innovating by creating new securities. When a rm changes its capital structure, it
produces new forms of risky debt and risky equity. Similarly, when a bank changes its
capital structure and portfolio, it produces new forms of risky deposits and risky equity.
The coordination of these activities depends on the existence of markets for securities that
do not exist in equilibrium.
We then turn to the critical question: What is the equilibrium, constrained e¢ cient
level of equity for banks and rms? The welfare theorems are crucial for the analysis of this
question. Solving for an equilibrium is di¢ cult, but since we know the equilibrium allocation
is constrained e¢ cient, we can use the necessary conditions for e¢ ciency to characterize the
equilibrium allocation. Our rst result shows that, if the technologies available to rms
3The rst best or a Pareto e¢ cient allocation cannot be attained because of the restriction to debt and
equity as the funding instruments available to rms and banks. However, if we similarly restrict the planner
to the allocations attainable using debt and equity, using so a notion of constrained e¢ ciency, he would not
be able to improve on the laisser faire equilibrium.
4Since there is a representative consumer lump sum taxes and transfers are not needed to decentralize
the constrained e¢ cient allocation.
5In this paper we ignore asymmetric information in order to focus on the welfare properties of the choices
made by banks and rms in a basic competitive environment. There is a large and well known literature on
moral hazard and risk shifting in banks. These considerations, as well as the possibility of bank bailouts in
the event of default, may distort the choice of the capital structure and introduce ine¢ ciencies.
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satisfy a property known as co-monotonicity, which implies that their productivities are
positively correlated, the value of bank capital will be zero in equilibrium. This is a striking
result, but one that has an intuitive explanation. The fundamental source of uncertainty in
the economy is the randomness of rmsproductivity. When a rm receives a negative shock
to productivity, it may be forced to default on its bank loans. This in turn makes bank
loans risky and may trigger bank default as well. Equity in rms and banks represents a
bu¤er that can absorb (some) losses and protect against costly default. The central question
is the e¢ cient allocation of equity between the corporate and banking sectors. In this
regard, the equity in the rmscapital structure does double duty.By protecting the rms
against default, it also shields the banks from default. In the special case of co-monotonic
technologies, this last consideration proves to be key. No matter what are the relative costs
of default in banks and rms, it is always e¢ cient to put all the equity in the corporate
sector, where shocks are rst felt.
The case of co-monotonic technologies is however special. If the productivity shocks
have an idiosyncratic component banks may reduce their risk exposure by lending to rms
using di¤erent technologies. In this case, the probability that any given technology receives
a negative productivity shock is smaller than the probability that some of the available
technologies receive a negative shock. Hence a diversied bank has a comparative advantage
in providing a bu¤er against these shocks. First, it only needs to hold a small amount of
equity because, in a typical state, only a small fraction of its portfolio of loans defaults.
Second, because there is often some type of rm that is defaulting, the banks equity bu¤er
is needed more often than the rmsequity bu¤er. In such cases, it may be e¢ cient for banks,
rather than rms, to issue equity. In general, both banks and rms may nd it (privately
and socially) optimal to issue equity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the economy
and the competitive equilibrium notion. In Section 3 we show the welfare properties of
equilibria. Section 4 examines the properties of banks capital structure in equilibrium.
First, Section 4.1 shows that when the technologies are co-monotonic, bank equity has zero
value in equilibrium. Then Section 4.2 characterizes the equilibrium capital structures in an
environment where productivity shocks have an idiosyncratic component, nding that they
feature a positive value of equity. Section 5 concludes. Proofs are collected in the appendix.
1.1 Related literature
The classic paper of Modigliani and Miller (1958) provides a benchmark in which capital
structure is indeterminate and has no e¤ect on the value of the rm. A large literature
has grown up investigating the role of various factors, such as taxes, bankruptcy, term
structure, seniority and incentive problems, in the choice of corporate capital structure. A
(non-representative) sample of this literature includes Brennan and Schwartz (1978), Barnea,
Haugen and Senbet (1981), Kim (1982), Titman (1984), Dammon and Green (1987), Titman
and Wessels (1988), Leland and Toft (1996), Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (2011) and Hackbarth
and Mauer (2012). In several cases the optimal capital structure is shown to be determinate.
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As we have already noted, the key ingredients of our model of bank capital structure are:
 the interdependence between banksand rmscapital structure, due to the interme-
diation role of banks;
 the fact that deposits earn a liquidity premium because of their use in transactions;
 the presence of costly default.
On the role of bank deposits as a source of funding for banks, Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
and Diamond (1984) show they constitute the optimal form of funding that provide liquidity
insurance to depositors or delegated monitoring for investors. Gale (2004) extended the
Diamond-Dybvig model to include bank capital that provides additional risk sharing between
risk neutral investors (equity holders) and risk averse depositors. The importance of the
liquidity services provided by deposits has also been argued, more recently, for instance by
Stein (2012) and De Angelo and Stulz (2015).
Our model assumes there are direct costs of default that reduce the value of the bank-
ruptcy estate. The empirical literature shows that these costs can be substantial for both
banks and non-nancial rms (see James, 1991; Andrade and Kaplan, 1998; Korteweg,
2010). More recent work suggests that these estimates may understate the true costs of
default (Almeida and Philippon, 2007; Acharya, Bharath and Srinivasan, 2007). We assume
that these costs are true deadweight costs as distinct from the re sale losses that are
actually transfers of value (cf. Gale and Gottardi, 2015).
Van den Heuvel (2008) studies a quantitative model in which bank capital structure is
determined by the trade-o¤ between the liquidity services of bank debt and the costs of
moral hazard that are associated with risk shifting behavior. The model does not allow for
aggregate uncertainty and assumes that deposits yield direct utility benets. DeAngelo and
Stulz (2015) also highlight the liquidity premium earned by bank deposits, contrasting it
with the costs of intermediation.
Gornall and Strebulaev (2015) provide a quantitative analysis of a model in which the
capital structures of banks and borrowers are endogenously determined. They show that
the optimal leverage in the banking sector is much higher than in the corporate sector. The
banks are less risky than the borrowers for two reasons. First, the banks hold senior debt
claims, so the rst loss falls on the corporate shareholders. Second, the banks reduce the
risk of their portfolio by diversifying across rms. These two factors are su¢ cient to produce
realistic levels of bank capital.
The paper most closely related to ours is Allen, Carletti and Marquez (2014), henceforth
ACM.6 Like us, ACM assume banks and rms can only issue debt (deposits) and equity.
They also assum that markets for deposits and equity are segmented. Some consumers can
6The published version of ACM, Allen, Carletti and Marquez (2015), contains only the rst part of the
working paper version and deals only with banks that invest directly in projects, rather than lending to
rms. The results more closely related to the present paper are found in the working paper version and, in
what follows, we refer only to that version.
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only hold deposits, whereas others can hold equity. Depositors have lower outside options
than equity investors, so in equilibrium the depositors receive a lower return than the equity
investors. Equity is therefore an expensivesource of funding.
The capital structure of the representative rm and bank are chosen to maximize their
expected joint surplus, subject to participation constraints for the equity holders and deposit
holders. This cooperative contracting approach guarantees the e¢ ciency of the equilibrium.
In our framework, by contrast, e¢ ciency is a property of competitive equilibrium when
markets are complete in the sense that all possible types of debt and equity can be traded.
ACM also derive a result that bank equity has zero value in equilibrium, for the special
case in which rmsreturns are perfectly correlated and uniformly distributed. In that case,
the bank is simply a pass-through for the shocks a¤ecting the rmsreturns and the bank
will default only if the rms default. ACM show that putting all the equity in the rms
minimizes the probability of default for both banks and rms.
The empirical literature on the relationship between a banks capital structure and its
market value is not large. Flannery and Rangan (2008) examined changes in bankscapital
structure in the previous decade. Mehran and Thakor (2011) found a positive relationship
between bank value and bank capital in a cross section of banks. Gropp and Heider (2010)
found that the determinants of bank capital structure were similar to those of non-nancial
rms, although the levels of equity are di¤erent.
We should also mention a large theoretical literature on the role of bank capital in
preventing risk shifting or asset substitution, beginning with the seminal paper of Stiglitz
and Weiss (1981) and including recent contributions such as Martinez-Miera and Repullo
(2010).
Our competitive equilibrium model is related to the literature on the theory of the rm in
incomplete markets, developed by Diamond (1967), Ekern andWilson (1974), Radner (1974),
Drèze (1974), and Grossman and Hart (1979). In the earlier literature, rms are fully owned
by shareholders and the equilibrium value of a rm is determined by the marginal valuations
of its owners. For example, a rm that produces a vector of future outputs y has market
value
v =
rui (xi)  y
krui (xi)k
where xi is the shareholders consumption bundle and rui (xi) is the vector of marginal
utilities. Our assumption of complete markets for debt and equity implies the existence of
equilibrium prices for all possible securities, even those that are not traded in equilibrium.
A similar approach is found in Makowski (1983) and Allen and Gale (1988, 1991). An
alternative to the complete markets approach is to assume that only traded securities are
priced, but that rms have rational conjectures about the value a security would have if a
small amount of it were introduced. This approach was used by Hart (1979), for example,
and appears to give the same results as the complete markets approach under su¢ ciently
strong regularity conditions.
The existence of intermediaries and the costs of default in our model make the pricing of
assets more complicated than in a stock market economy. Because a rms debt is held by
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banks and default can occur at the rm level, the bank level, or both, the value of a rms
debt will depend on bankswillingness to pay for it, which in turn depends on the banks
capital structure and the consumerswillingness to pay for the debt and equity of banks.
See also Bisin, Gottardi and Ruta (2014) on the pricing of securities when intermediaries are
present.
2 An equilibrium model of bankscapital structure
2.1 Endowments and technologies
There are two dates, indexed t = 0; 1, and a nite number of states of nature, s = 1; :::; S.
The true state is unknown at date 0 and revealed at date 1. The probability of state s at
date 0 is denoted by s > 0, for s = 1; :::; S.
There are two goods, a non-produced capital good and a produced consumption good.
Consumption is produced subject to constant returns to scale using capital goods as the
only input. There is a nite number of technologies, indexed j = 1; :::; n, for producing the
consumption good. Using technology j, one unit of capital at date 0 produces Ajs > 0 units
of consumption at date 1 in state s.
There is a continuum of identical consumers with unit mass. Each consumer has an
initial endowment of k0 = 1 units of capital at date 0. There is no initial endowment of
consumption.
2.2 Firms
We assume that each active rm can invest in only one of the n technologies available.
Because production is subject to constant returns to scale, we can focus without loss of
generality on the case where each rm uses one unit of capital. The amount of capital
invested in each technology is then equal to the number of rms using that technology.
In this environment, a rms capital structure is determined by the face value of the debt
it issues. The face value of the debt is denoted by ` and is assumed to belong to a nite
interval L = [0; `max].
Because productivity shocks are the only source of uncertainty, the technology choices
made by rms determine the level of risk in the economy, while their capital structure choices
determine how this risk is distributed between debt and equity.
Firms are identical ex ante but they may di¤er in their choice of technology and capital
structure. A rms choice of face value of debt ` and technology j is referred to as the rms
type. The set of rm types is denoted by F  L  N , with generic element (`; j), where
N = f1; :::; ng denotes the set of available technologies. Although the number of possible
types is innite, we focus on equilibria in which the number of active types is nite.7
7The number of active types needed for existence is nite by Caratheodorys Theorem.
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A rm of type f = (`; j) 2 F issues debt and equity. The payo¤ vectors of these assets,
denoted, respectively, by adf 2 RS+ and aef 2 RS+, are uniquely determined by the rms type
f = (`; j) as follows:
adfs =

` if Ajs  `
fAjs if Ajs < `
(1)
and
aefs =

Ajs   ` if Ajs  `
0 if Ajs < `
(2)
for any state s. The parameter 0  f < 1 is the rms recovery ratio in the event of default.
In other words, the default costs are 1   f per unit of output. For generality, we allow
the recovery ratio to depend on the rms type f , but this is not necessary and, in most
applications, f is independent of f .
Firms choose their technology and capital structure to maximize their prots, which
is equivalent to maximizing the rms market value. Since rms are subject to constant
returns to scale, prots must be zero in equilibrium. In other words, the market value of the
securities issued by a rm is just enough to nance the purchase of capital goods. Types of
rms that cannot earn a zero prot will not operate in equilibrium.
Securities issued by rms are sold on competitive markets. In line with our completeness
assumption, there is a price at which the securities issued by each type of rm are traded.
Prices are denoted by the vector qF =
 
qdF ;q
e
F
 2 RF+ RF+, where qdF is the subvector of
debt prices and qeF is the subvector of equity prices. The market value of a rm of type
f then is qdf + q
e
f . We normalize the price of capital goods to be equal to one. Hence, in
equilibrium, we have qdf + q
e
f  1 for any f 2 F otherwise the demand for capital goods
would be unbounded and only the rm-types that achieve zero prots, qdf + q
e
f = 1, will
operate in equilibrium.
2.3 Banks
Banks lend to rms by purchasing their debt. We assume banks do not invest in rm equity.8
Banks raise funds by issuing deposits and equity to consumers. A banks capital structure is
determined by the level of deposits it chooses to issue. We denote the face value of deposits
by d 2 D, where D is a nite interval [0; dmax]. The banks portfolio is described by a vector
x 2 RF+, where xf  0 denotes the units of debt of type-f rms held by the bank.9 Since
the bankstechnology is subject to constant returns to scale, we can assume without loss of
generality that each banks portfolio is normalized so that
P
f2F xf = 1. In other words,
the bank invests in a portfolio of debt issued by rms that collectively operate one unit of
capital goods. Let X  RF+ denote the set of admissible debt portfolios.
8This ensures the presence of a nontrivial interdependence between the capital structure of rms and
banks. Also, current regulations make this assumption realistic.
9In equilibrium, each bank will lend to a nite number of types of rms, since the number of active rm
types is nite.
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All banks have access to all types of rmsdebt and the same funding opportunities.
Their portfolios and capital structures may di¤er, however. We refer to a banks portfolio x
and capital structure d as its type. The set of bank types is B = X D. Again, only a nite
number of bank types will be active in equilibrium. Let xb denote the portfolio of a bank of
type b. The payo¤ vectors of the deposits and equity issued by a bank of type b are denoted
by adb 2 RS+ and aeb 2 RS+, respectively, and dened by
adbs =

d if x  adFs  d
b
 
x  adFs

if x  adFs < d (3)
and
aebs =

x  adFs   d if x  adFs  d
0 if x  adFs < d; (4)
for every state s, where the vector adFs is dened by
adFs =
 
adfs

f2F
for each s. Note that the payo¤ vectors are completely determined by the banks type, as in
equations (3) and (4). The recovery rate 0  b  1 is a constant and may or not depend
on the banks type b 2 B.
The problem of each bank is to select its portfolio and its capital structure to maximize
its prots, given by the di¤erence between its market value, that is the value of the liabilities
it issued, and the value of the portfolio it acquired. The bank takes as given the price of
all debt claims issued by rms, qdF 2 RF+; as well as the prices of all types of securities the
banks can issue, qB =
 
qdB;q
e
B
 2 RB+RB+, where qdB is the subvector of deposit prices and
qeB is the subvector of equity prices. More formally, each bank will choose its type b 2 B
to maximize market value minus the cost of the assets it acquired, qdb + q
e
b   qdF  x. In
equilibrium, the maximum prot will be zero, that is, qdb + q
e
b  qdF  x, and only banks that
achieve zero prots, qdb + q
e
b = q
d
F  x, will be active.
2.4 Consumers
All consumption takes place at date 1, when the output of consumption good is realized.
Consumers have VNM preferences over consumption described byX
s
su (c1s + c2s) ; (5)
where c1s denotes the consumption in state s that can occur immediately, because it is paid
for with deposits, while c2s denotes the consumption which is paid for with the yields of
equity, and occurs with some delay. The constant 0 <  < 1 captures the cost of this
delay. The specication of the preferences reects the assumption that deposits serve as
money, whereas equity does not. The delay (or equivalently, transaction) costs involved in
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converting equity into cash are measured by the parameter  2 (0; 1).10 The function
u : R+ ! R, describing the utility of total consumption in any state s; c1s+c2s, is assumed
to be increasing, concave and continuously di¤erentiable.
Each consumer can use the revenue obtained by selling his endowment of capital at
date 0 to purchase the deposits and equity issued by banks and the equity issued by rms.
Consumers cannot purchase rm debt directly, but hold it indirectly by investing in banks
that purchase rm debt.11
A consumers portfolio is described by a vector z  (zF ; zB) 2 RF+RF+RB+RB+, where 
zdb ; z
e
b

denotes the consumers demand for debt and equity issued by banks of type b and
similarly for
 
zdf ; z
e
f

. Although consumers have access to an innite number of securities, the
consumers portfolio must have a nite support in equilibrium. The set of feasible portfolios
is denoted by Z and dened to be the set of portfolios z with nite support such that
zdf = 0 for all f 2 F . Letting q  (qF ;qB), the consumer chooses a consumption bundle
c = (c1; c2) 2 RS+ RS+ and a portfolio z 2 Z to maximize
U (c) 
SX
s=1
su (c1s + c2s)
subject to the budget constraints,
q  z  1;
c1 =
X
b2B
zdba
d
b ;
c2 =
X
b2B
zeba
e
h +
X
f2F
zefa
e
h:
2.5 Equilibrium
An allocation is described by a consumption bundle, c, and a portfolio, z, of the representa-
tive consumer, a distribution of banks over the set of possible bank types  = (b)b2B, and
a distribution of rm types  = (f )f2F . Formally, the allocation is an array (c; z;;),
where z, , and  have nite supports. An allocation is attainable ifX
f2F
f = 1; (6)
10The specication is a reduced-form representation of the greater convenience of using deposits for con-
sumption compared to equity. A shareholder who wants to convert shares into consumption must pay a
commission to sell the shares. Dividends are paid infrequently and must be converted into deposits before
they can be spent. This time delay reduces the value of the consumption because of discounting.
11Although we maintain the assumption for simplicity, it seems quite realistic. Banks may have an ad-
vantage in monitoring rms and enforcing repayment of loans. And since loans to rms do not function as
money,deposits are more attractive to consumers in any case.
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X
b2B
bx = ; (7)
zdb = z
e
b = b; 8b 2 B; (8)
zef = f ; 8f 2 F; (9)
and
c = z  a =
 X
b2B
zdba
d
b ;
X
b2B
zeba
e
b +
X
f2F
zefa
e
f
!
: (10)
The rst attainability condition (6) says that the rms collectively use the entire one unit
of the capital good in the consumersendowments. The second condition, (7), says that
banks hold in their portfolio all the debt issued by rms. The third and fourth conditions,
(8) and (9), say that consumers hold all the deposits and equity issued by banks and all the
equity issued by rms. Finally, the last condition, (10), restates the relationship between
consumption and the payo¤ of the portfolio held by consumers.
An equilibrium consists of an attainable allocation (c; z;;) and a price system q such
that:
(i) f > 0 only if f solves the rms problem, given the prices q;
(ii) b > 0 only if b solves the banks problem, given the prices q;
(iii) (c; z) solves the consumers problem, given the prices q.
Note that equilibrium condition (i) is equivalent to
f > 0 =) qdf + qef = max
f2F

qdf + q
e
f
	
= 1;
for any f 2 F . Similarly, equilibrium condition (ii) is equivalent to
b > 0 =) qdb + qeb   qdF  x = max
b2B

qdb + q
e
b   qdF  x
	
= 0;
for any b 2 B. In what follows, we refer to a rm of type f (respectively, bank of type b) as
being active in equilibrium if and only if f > 0 (respectively, 

b > 0). Also, prices are such
that markets for the securities of non active rms clear with zero trades.
3 Constrained e¢ ciency
In this section, we show that analogues of the Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics
hold for the environment described above. Markets are incomplete, since banks and rms
are restricted to using debt and equity, so the appropriate welfare concept is constrained
Pareto e¢ ciency, rather than Pareto e¢ ciency.
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We say that an attainable allocation (c; z;;) is constrained Pareto e¢ cient, or
constrained e¢ cient, for short, if there does not exist an attainable allocation (c; z;;)
such that U (c) > U (c). Formally, this is the case if and only if (c;) solves the problem
max
(c;)
SX
s=1
su (c1s + c2s)
subject to the constraints X
b2B
b = 1; (11a)
c =
X
b2B
b
 
adb ; a
e
b

+
X
b2B
bx  aeF : (12a)
To see this, note rst that if (c;) satises the constraints (11a) and (12a), we can use the
attainability conditions (8) and (9) to dene the consumersportfolio z and use the attain-
ability condition (7) to dene f . Then it is easy to check that (c; z;;) satises the
attainability constraints (6) to (10). Conversely, if (c; z;;) is an attainable allocation,
(c;) satises the constraints.12
Proposition 1 Let (c; z;;;q) be an equilibrium. Then (c; z;;) is constrained
Pareto e¢ cient.
The argument of the proof is standard, and exploits the fact that markets for all the pos-
sible types of securities that can be issued by rms and banks are competitive and complete.
Also, note that the set of attainable consumption vectors satisfying (11a), (12a) is convex
and this allows us to establish the following:
Proposition 2 Suppose that (c; z;;) is a constrained e¢ cient allocation. Then there
exists a price vector q such that (c; z;;;q) is an equilibrium.
Although these results look quite standard, they require a number of restrictive as-
sumptions. Without a complete set of markets for contingent claims, we can only ensure
equilibrium is constrained e¢ cient. As Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) have shown,
competitive equilibria with incomplete markets are generically constrained ine¢ cient unless
special conditions are satised. One of these conditions is the existence of a single represen-
tative consumer; another is the assumption of a single good. These assumptions are common
in nancial applications, but they are nonetheless restrictive. The representative consumer
assumption is not crucial as long as there is a single good, we could extend the theory to
allow for multiple types of consumers but the single good assumption would be harder to
remove. Finally, the assumption that markets are open for all securities is crucial for the
12To show this, we simply need to use the attainability conditions (7), (8), and (9) to eliminate z and
 from (10), getting constraint (12a) as a result. Similarly, the attainability conditions (6) and (7) imply
constraint (11a).
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coordination of capital structures.13 The resulting benchmark model is important for two
reasons: rst, it demonstrates the possibility of e¢ cient coordination of capital structures in
a decentralized economy and, second, it considerably simplies the characterization of the
equilibrium capital structures as the solution of a planners problem.
4 Banksequilibrium capital structure
The use of equity is costly because it reduces the portion of the cash ow of banks and rms
that is paid out as liquid deposits. In the case of banks, an increase in equity directly reduces
the amount of deposits needed to fund the banks portfolio. In the case of rms, an increase
in equity reduces the amount rms borrow from banks and that in turn reduces the amount
of funding needed by banks, either in the form of deposits or equity. The benet of equity,
of course, is that it provides a bu¤er against the risk of costly default. A rms revenue
is uncertain because rms invest in risky technologies and a banks revenue is uncertain
because banks lend to risky rms. In either case, the higher the size of the equity bu¤er, the
lower the probability of default. Moreover, the role of banks as intermediaries implies that
the riskiness of their portfolios depends on the size of the rmsequity bu¤ers: the larger the
rmsbu¤er, the less likely rms are to default, and the safer is the banks portfolio. Hence,
rm equity does double duty, in the sense that, by providing a bu¤er against default by
the rm, it also helps to prevent default by the bank that lends to the rm.
The capital structure is not the only factor a¤ecting the risk of default. The rmschoice
of a technology also contributes to the level of aggregate risk in the economy and to the
probability of default for individual rms and banks. Similarly, the banksportfolio choices
and the possibility of diversication may reduce the banksprobability of default.
While it is clear that the cost of issuing equity is increasing in the liquidity premium
1  and the benets are increasing in the default costs, 1 b and 1 f , it is not obvious
what implications this has for the optimal capital structures of banks and rms. The answer
to this question depends crucially on the nature of the shocks a¤ecting rmstechnologies
and the e¤ectiveness of banksportfolio choice in diversifying this risk, which determine how
rmsproductivity shocks are transmitted to banks. Uncertainty arises because the rms
invest in risky technologies. This uncertainty is transmitted to banks when rms default on
their loans. Firm equity does double dutyin the sense that it protects both the rm and
the bank from default. If the technology shocks are su¢ ciently correlated, it may be optimal
for all the loss absorption capacityto be located in the corporate sector and none in the
banking sector. Firm equity is all that is needed.
13Hart (1979) follows an alternative approach, in which the equilibrium of a stock market economy is
reached in two stages. In the rst stage, rms choose production plans and have rational expectations about
the value of the rm that will be realized in the second stage. This approach only requires markets to open
for the shares of rms that actually form. Under su¢ cient regularity conditions, this appears to be equivalent
to the approach adopted here.
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4.1 No bank equity
As we have already noted, ACM derive the surprising result that it is optimal for banks to
fund themselves entirely with deposits when there is a single technology that rms can use.14
We obtain an analogous result under a much weaker condition. In this section, we assume
the n available technologies are co-monotonic.
Denition 3 Technologies are said to be co-monotonic if Ajs 1 < Ajs, for every s = 2; :::; S
and j = 1; :::; n.
This condition requires that the productivities of all technologies are increasing functions of
the state s. In other words, the productivity shocks are driven by a single factor and there is
no idiosyncratic component. As a consequence, an increase in s reduces defaults for all types
of rms and banks and we get the surprising result that, in equilibrium, banks default if any
of their borrowers default. Each bank is so on a knife edge, with no capacity to absorb losses.
It is both privately and socially optimal for banks and rms to choose capital structures that
put all equity in the corporate sector. In the case of co-monotonic technologies, the double
duty role of rm equity is particularly e¤ective.
Proposition 4 Assume that technologies are co-monotonic. Then if (c; z; ; ; q) is an
equilibrium, the value of bank equity is zero for all active bank types b 2 B.
It is interesting to note that this result depends only on the stochastic properties of the
technology shocks. In particular, it is independent of the relative size of default costs for
rms and banks. A formal proof of the proposition is found in the appendix. Here we present
the main steps. Let `b denote the face value of rmsdebt held by type b banks and let `b (s)
denote the actual amount repaid to these banks by rms in state s. It is also convenient
to use the notation b and f  to indicate the types of banks and rms that are active in
equilibrium.
Step 1: For all active bank types b = (x;d); the value of bank equity is positive if and
only if `b > d.
If d  `b it is clear that there would be nothing left over for the banks equity holders, even
if the banks loans are repaid in full. Note that it is never optimal for an active rm to
choose a face value of debt ` > AjS (otherwise the rm will always be in default and incur
unnecessary costs of default). As a consequence at least in the highest state, s = S, all rms
whose debt is in the banks portfolio are solvent and pay the face value of their debt so that,
if d < `b ; the return to equity is `b   d > 0. Limited liability ensures the payment to
equity holders is non-negative in every state, so this is enough to prove that the value of
equity is positive.
14ACM make a number of other restrictive assumptions not required in our framework: consumers are
risk neutral and exogenously divided into depositors and shareholders; the single technologys productivity
shocks are uniformly distributed; and banks and rms choose their capital structures cooperatively.
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Step 2: For each active rms type f  = (`; j), there exists a state sf such that rm f 
is solvent if and only if s  sf. Similarly, for each active banks type b there exists a state
sb such that bank b is solvent if and only if s  sb.
Firm f  is solvent if and only if Ajs  `. Then the rst claim follows from the fact
that Ajs is increasing in s and, as argued in Step 1, each active rm is solvent in at least one
state. Next note that the revenue of each rm (net of bankruptcy costs) is increasing in s
and so the amount repaid to banks is non-decreasing in s. This, together with the fact that
also for banks it is optimal to be solvent in at least one state, establishes the second claim.
Step 3: For each active bank type b, the face value of deposits satises d = `b (sb), that
is, equals the yield of the banksportfolio in the lowest state in which the bank is solvent.
Since bank b is solvent in state sb we must have d  `b (sb). If d < `b (sb) the bank
has the option of increasing the face value of deposits without increasing the probability of
default. Since the bank is already in default in states s < sb, increasing the face value of
deposits will not change the amount of consumption received by deposit holders or equity
holders in states s < sb. In states s  sb, on the other hand, an increase in the face value
of deposits will transfer consumption to the banks depositors from the banks shareholders.
Since one unit of consumption from equitys returns is worth  units of consumption from
deposits returns, and there is a representative consumer, so shareholders and depositors
are the same individuals, this transfer will increase welfare, contradicting the constrained
e¢ ciency of equilibrium. Hence, in equilibrium, we must have d = `b (sb).
Step 4: For all types of banks b that are active in equilibrium equity has no value: d = `b.
Note rst that it is never optimal for a bank to choose d > `b because this implies the
bank defaults in each state, which contradicts what established in step 2. Suppose next that
d < `b, contrary to what we want to prove. Since we showed in Step 3 that d = `b (sb) ;
this implies that at least one type f  of rms whose debt is held by bank b is bankrupt in
state sb. Consider then a reduction in the face value of debt of these rms to a value equal
to their revenue in state sb. Hence the rms no longer default in state sb and possibly in
other states, so that default costs are avoided and the payment to the rmsdebtholders
in these states will be higher. This ensures that the bank is still solvent in state sb and
so depositorsreturns are unchanged. The change will then have two e¤ects. First, it will
increase the returns both to banksand to rmsequityholders in the states s 2 [sb ; sf ]
where rms f  were insolvent and are now solvent. Second, it will increase the returns to
rmsequityholders and reduce, by the same amount, that of the banksequity holders in
the states s  sf where rms f  were solvent. Since the equity of both rms and banks is
held by the representative agent, this second e¤ect does not a¤ect welfare, while the rst is
unambiguously welfare increasing. This contradicts the constrained e¢ ciency of equilibrium
and shows so that we cannot have d < `b in equilibrium. Then the value of bank equity
must be zero.
The above argument shows that default by one or more of the borrowing rms is always
a necessary condition for the lending bank to default, because a bank will never set the face
value of deposits d higher than the face value of the debt it holds. This clearly illustrates
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the fact that rm equity always does double duty,serving as a bu¤er against both bank
default and rm default.
The co-monotonicity assumption is stated as a property of the productivity of all the
technologies available in the economy. It is easy to see from the proof of Proposition 4 that
this result is valid as long as the bank lends only to rms with co-monotonic technologies.
For any bank portfolio x, let the set of technologies represented in the portfolio be denoted
by J (x) and dened by
J (x) =

j = 1; :::; n : x(`;j) > 0 for some `
	
:
Then we say that the portfolio x is co-monotonic if the set of technologies J (x) is co-
monotonic in the usual sense. The following corollary is then immediate.
Corollary 5 In any equilibrium (c; z; ; ; q), the value of equity is zero for any active
bank b whose portfolio x is co-monotonic.
Since the banks portfolio is endogenous, the corollary gives us no information about the
conditions under which a co-monotonic portfolio will be chosen in equilibrium. It merely
emphasizes that bank capital is not needed as long as the bank does not diversify its portfolio
outside a set of co-monotonic technologies. In particular, if a bank does not diversify its
portfolio and only lends to rms using a single technology j, the bank will have zero equity
(its portfolio is then trivially monotonic).
Proposition 4 states that banks use debt nancing exclusively. It does not say anything
about the capital structure of rms, however. For example, it does not claim that rms will
issue equity to reduce their default risk. The rmschoice of capital structure will depend
on model parameters, such as the recovery rates of banks and rms, b and f . The higher
the default costs, other things being equal, the higher one expects the rmsequity to be.
The only certainty is that banks will use no equity in equilibrium.
Proposition 4 is also silent on the variety of capital structures and technologies used
by rms in equilibrium, as well as on the portfolio choice by banks. Because of the non-
convexities that are an essential part of the model, we allow the full use of the convexifying
e¤ect of large numbers in order to ensure the existence of an equilibrium. Many types of
rms, distinguished by their capital structures and technology choices, as well as many types
of banks, distinguished by their portfolio choice, are potentially active in equilibrium. To
make the analysis tractable and say more about the properties of equilibria, it will be useful
to consider some special cases where the number of active types is limited. We consider a
few of these cases in the next section.
To sum up, an important implication of co-monotonicity is that under this condition
there is little scope for diversication in the choice of banksportfolios. As argued above,
defaults are positively correlated in the sense that an increase in the state s will reduce or
leave unchanged the set of defaulting banks and rms. Thus, banksability to reduce their
default probability by diversifying their portfolio of loans among rms of di¤erent types is
quite limited. Equity is the main instrument to limit default and the e¢ cient place to allocate
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equity is at the source of uncertainty, that is, in the rms at the top of the intermediation
chain. Conversely, violating the co-monotonicity assumption is a necessary condition for
bank equity to have positive value in equilibrium. For banks to issue equity, there must be
benets from diversication, that is, the possibility of reducing the probability of default by
diversifying the banks portfolio across rms using non-co-monotonic technologies. The next
section identies some environments where the benets of diversication are present and are
exploited by banks.
4.2 Positive bank equity
In this section we explore environments with both aggregate and idiosyncratic productivity
shocks and identify conditions under which constrained e¢ ciency requires a positive value of
bank equity. We will assume that consumers are risk neutral, which simplies the character-
ization of equilibrium prices and quantities. Under this assumption, an attainable allocation
(c; z;;) is constrained e¢ cient if and only if any type of bank b in the support of 
satises
SX
s=1
s (c

1s + c

2s) =
SX
s=1
s
 
adbs +  (a
e
bs + x

b  aeF )

:
In other words, if we think of an active bank and the rms that borrow from it as a conglom-
erate, the market value of this conglomerate must equal the expected value of consumption
for the representative consumer. If this condition were not satised, either the bank or the
rms or both would not be maximizing their market values. We use this property repeatedly
in what follows.
An example with aggregate and idiosyncratic risk We consider rst a simple envi-
ronment in which it is possible to derive the equilibrium capital structures explicitly. There
are n technologies and a nite number S = n + 2 of states of nature. The probability of
state s is denoted by s and given by
s =
8<:
1  "
n
for 1  s  n
 for s = n+ 1
" for s = n+ 2
: (13)
The productivity of technology j in state s is assumed to satisfy
Ajs =
8>><>>:
aL if s = j  n
aM if s 6= j  n
aM if s = n+ 1
aH if s = n+ 2
; (14)
where 0 < aL < aM < aH . The states are partitioned as follows:
 if a state s 2 f1; ::; ng occurs, exactly one technology j = s receives a negative shock,
aL, while the remaining technologies j 6= s have normal productivity, aM ;
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 if state s = n+ 1 occurs, all technologies have normal productivity;
 and if state n+ 2 is realized, all technologies have a high productivity, aH .
Since the states 1; ::; n are equally likely, the technologies are ex ante identical. Also, the
environment exhibits both aggregate and idiosyncratic uncertainty. We can view the real-
ization of one of the states in the baseline set f1; ::; ng as a purely idiosyncratic shock, while
the realization of state n + 1 (respectively n + 2) constitutes a small (respectively large)
aggregate shock relative to the baseline states.
A bank portfolio is said to be simple if all rms with the same technology, whose debt is
held by the bank, have the same capital structure. We can show that it is optimal for banks
to choose a simple portfolio when the structure of technologies satises (13) and (14). Since
the technologies are ex ante identical, it follows that the same capital structure is optimal
for all rms.
Proposition 6 When the technologies satisfy (13) and (14), in equilibrium every bank
chooses a simple portfolio, that is, one containing either (i) only the debt of rms with
no default risk (`j = aL), or (ii) only the debt of rms with low default risk (`j = aM), or
(iii) only the debt of rms with high default risk (`j = aH).
Given the technology structure, there are three possible candidates for the face value of
the rms debt. The rm can choose the face value equal to aL, so that it never defaults,
or aM , so that the rm only defaults when hit by a negative shock, or aH , so that the rm
defaults unless it is hit by a large positive shock. Proposition 6 assures us that a bank
will lend to rms that use only one of these capital structures. Unfortunately, there is no
intuitive explanation for this result. The proof proceeds by considering all possible portfolios
and showing that non-simple portfolios are always dominated.
The specication given by (13) and (14) incorporates a number of interesting cases. In
the limit as  + " ! 1, all technologies are identical (there is only aggregate risk) and,
hence, co-monotonic. Then Proposition 4 implies that the value of bank equity will be zero
in any equilibrium when  + " = 1. At the other extreme, in the limit as  ! 0 and
" ! 0, we have the case of pure idiosyncratic risk. In each of the baseline states f1; ::; ng,
exactly one technology yields aL and the remainder yield aM . In this case too, we show that
bank equity has zero value, but for rather di¤erent reasons than in the co-monotonic case.
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium allocations in the idiosyncratic case.
These allocations are, of course, constrained e¢ cient by Proposition 1.
Proposition 7 Assume the technologies satisfy (13), (14) and  = " = 0. Then in equilib-
rium bankschoices are as follows:
(i) if

n f
n 1

aL > aM , each bank lends exclusively to rms with safe debt (`j = aL) and15
sets its level of deposits at d = aL, or
15Since the yield of the debt of rms with safe debt is always the same, whichever their technology, the
composition of the banks portfolio (with regard to the debt of these rms) is clearly irrelevant).
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(ii) if

n f
n 1

aL < aM , each bank lends exclusively to rms with risky debt (`j = aM) and
chooses a fully diversied portfolio (holding 1=n units of the debt of rms choosing technology
j, for each j 2 f1; ::; ng) and sets
d =
n  1
n
aM +
1
n
faL:
In either case bank equity has zero value.
When  = " = 0, there are two possible equilibrium allocations, distinguished by the face
value of rmsdebt and by whether or not rms default. In each equilbrium allocation,
banks portfolios are risk free. Note that a risk free portfolio should always be entirely
funded with deposits because equity is costly ( < 1) and there is no need for an equity
bu¤er in absence of default risk.
In both of the extreme cases in our example, that is, when  = " = 0 and  + " = 1, it is
optimal to have zero bank equity. In between the two extremes, when there is both aggregate
risk and idiosyncratic risk, there is a role for equity in the e¢ cient capital structures of both
rms and banks. The following result states this more precisely.
Proposition 8 Assume the technologies satisfy (13) and (14). Then if
n  f
n  1

aL < aM ;
there exist  > 0 and " > 0 such that, for any 0 <  <  and 0  " < ", in any
equilibrium, each bank chooses a fully diversied portfolio of risky rm debt
x =

0;
1
n
; 0
n
j=1
and a face value of deposits
d =
n  1
n
aM +
1
n
faL:
Obviously, bank equity has positive value because a bank receives a loan repayment equal to
aM > d in state s = n+ 1, n+ 2. The value of rm equity is also positive if " > 0, because
the shareholders of the representative rm receive aH   aM > 0 in state s = n+ 2.
The rst condition required for the claim in Proposition 8 is that the size of the negative
idiosyncratic shock, aM   aL, is su¢ ciently large, so that, when  = " = 0, rms choose
` = aM and banks choose a fully diversied portfolio in equilibrium. This corresponds to
Case (ii) of Proposition 7. The second condition is that  and " are both positive, but not
too large. That is, we are su¢ ciently close to the case of purely idiosyncratic uncertainty so
that rmsand banksdebt level and banksportfolio are the same as when  = " = 0.
To gain some understanding of why banks choose a positive level of equity under the
conditions of Proposition 8, note that rms choose a risky face value of debt, `j = aM , so a
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rm choosing technology j defaults in state s = j. To avoid default in all states, the rm
would have to reduce its debt level `j from aM to aL. Given the relatively small likelihood of
state s = j, the cost would outweigh the benets. On the other hand, the introduction of an
equity bu¤er to prevent the default of a diversied bank would be much cheaper. First, the
probability that some rm whose debt is held by the bank defaults is n times higher than
the probability that any given rm defaults. A shock that is unlikely to a¤ect a particular
rm is so quite likely to a¤ect a diversied bank. Second, the required equity bu¤er is much
smaller than in the rms case, because the debt of the defaulting rm is a small fraction of
the banks portfolio. We begin so to see why banks choose to hold a capital bu¤er against
a shock while rms do not.
The table below summarizes the equilibrium values of bank and rm equity in the di¤erent
cases characterized by Propositions 7 and 8:16
Parameters Value of bank equity Value of rm equity
0   < ; 0 < " < " > 0 > 0
0 <  < ; " = 0 > 0 = 0
"+  = 1 = 0 ??
"+  = 0 = 0 > 0
Note that whether rm equity has positive or zero value in the co-monotonic case "+  = 1
depends on parameter values. There are two possible equilibrium outcomes: in one `j = aM
and the value of rm equity is positive, in the other, `j = aH and the value of rm equity is
zero.
The technologies dened by (13) and (14) also allow us to explore the connection between
portfolio diversication and the presence of positive bank equity. We noted at the end of
Section 4.1 that bank equity cannot have positive value unless banks diversify their portfolios.
In other words, bank equity has no role as a bu¤er unless the bank faces risks that can be
partly diversied. At the same time, one can have diversication without a positive value of
bank equity, as we saw in case (ii) of Proposition 7, where bank equity has zero value and
the banks portfolio is risk free. But there are other situations where there is a risk of default
that could be reduced by diversication, yet banks choose not to diversify and to issue no
equity, accepting a positive probability of default.
Proposition 9 Assume that rms technologies satisfy (13), (14) and " = 0. Then there
exists  > 0 such that, for all  <  < 1, any equilibrium has the following properties:
each bank lends to rms using a single technology j; rms using technology j have face value
of debt `j = aM , and bank deposits are d = aM . Both the rms using technology j and the
banks lending to them default in state s = j.
The proof follows an argument parallel to the proof of Proposition 8. In the limit, when  = 1,
there is no risk and banks and rms choose d = ` = aM . For  < 1 su¢ ciently close to 1,
16We maintain here the condition

n f
n 1

aL < aM :
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the upper hemicontinuity of the constrained e¢ cient allocation correspondence implies that
Proposition 9 holds. To avoid default, even with diversication, an equity bu¤er is needed,
as we saw in Proposition 8, that is bounded away from zero. As  ! 1, the cost of the
bu¤er remains bounded away from zero while the benet converges to zero. When the bank
chooses d = aM , on the other hand, the value of diversication is negative: the probability
of default is minimized by choosing a simple portfolio and the benet of this choice increases
as  ! 1. Thus, even if diversication is possible, it is not always optimal. This principle
is also illustrated by ACM, who analyse an environment with two i.i.d. technologies and
show that, for some parameter values, it is optimal for banks to lend only to rms using
one of the technologies, that is, to choose a co-monotonic portfolio. In that case, it will
be optimal for the bank equity to have zero value, even though there appears to be scope
for diversication. Evidently, the gains from diversication have to be su¢ ciently large
before they provide a motive for banks to issue a positive value of equity. In other words, a
violation of co-monotonicity is necessary, but not su¢ cient, for bank equity to have positive
value.
A single factor model In the banking literature, single factor models, such as the
one due to Vasicek (2002), are widely used to represent loss distributions of bank portfolios.
Single factor models have also been incorporated in equilibrium models, such as Martinez-
Miera and Repullo (2010), in order to study the e¤ect of capital requirements on bank failure.
In single factor models, the value of the assets Aj (T ) of a borrowing rm j at time T are
assumed to be the product of two random variables,
logAj (T ) = logAj (0) + log
p
z + log
p
1  "j;
where z is a standard normal aggregate shock, "j is a standard normal idiosyncratic shock, 
is the correlation parameter, and the random variables z and f"jg are i.i.d.. Firm j defaults
at time T if Bj > Aj (T ), where Bj is the face value of the loan given by the bank.
We can obtain something very similar in our model if we assume that there is a large
number of technologies j 2 [0; 1] with productivities per unit of capital given by Aj = ja,
where j and a are random variables with c.d.f.s F and G, respectively. Both F and G are
C2 and satisfy
F (0) = 0; F (1) = 1; and F 0 (j) > 0 for 0 < j < 1, F 0 (0) = 0 = F 0 (1) (15)
and
G (a0) = 0; G (a1) = 1; and G0 (a) > 0 for a0 < a < a1: (16)
The random variables j and a represent idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, respectively.
The random variables fjg are assumed to be i.i.d and independent of the aggregate shock
a. We also normalize the variables j so that E [j] = 1. The law of large numbers holds, so
the cross sectional distribution of the idiosyncratic shock is given by F with probability one.
It is clear that the available technologies are not co-monotonic, though the productivities
are positively correlated because of the common shock a.
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Our main focus here is on the capital structure decisions by banks. To this end, and
also in order to mimic the properties of single factor models, which take capital structures
and the loan portfolio as exogenous and (sometimes) symmetric, we assume here that all
rms choose the same capital structure, regardless of their technology. We can argue this
is natural since the technologies are ex ante identical.17 We also assume that every bank
chooses a fully diversied and symmetric portfolio containing an equal amount of the debt
issued by rms choosing each technology j.
When the face value of rmsdebt is given by `, the return on a fully diversied portfolio
of rmsdebt depends only on the aggregate state a and is denoted by ` (a). We need to
consider three cases, depending on the size of the aggregate productivity shock. In the rst
case, the aggregate shock a is su¢ ciently small that all rms default. This happens if and
only if a < ` for all 0    1, which is equivalent to 1a  ` or 1  `=a. In that case,
every rm pays the bank fa and the total repayment is
` (a) =
Z 1
0
fadF = fa;
since E [] = 1. In the second case, rms with the lowest idiosyncratic shocks default and
rms with the highest idiosyncratic shocks repay in full. This case occurs if a = ` for some
0 <  < 1, or 0 < `=a < 1. Firms with a shock  < `=a default and repay a, rms
with a shock   `=a repay `, and the total repayment to the bank is
` (a) =
Z `=a
0
fadF + `

1  F

`
a

:
In the third case, the aggregate shock is high enough that all rms are solvent and can repay
the face value of the debt in full. This happens if a  ` for all 0    1, which is
equivalent to 1  `=a. Each rm repays ` and the total repayment is ` (a) = `. Thus, the
return on the banks portfolio is
` (a) =
8<:
fa if 1  `=a
f
R `=a
0
adF + ` (1  F (`=a)) if 0 < `=a < 1;
` if `=a  0
:
We see from the expression of ` (a) that in this single factor model the return on the
banks portfolio depends only on the aggregate state a, but idiosyncratic risk plays a role in
determining the size of the total repayment to the bank. This is clearly seen in the second
case considered above, where a fraction F (`=a) default and a fraction 1   F (`=a) repay
in full. Because of the default cost, 1   f , the larger the number of defaults, the lower
17Technically, the productivities of the di¤erent technologies are exchangeable random variables, that is,
the joint distribution function is independent of any permutation of the random variables. Hence we can
argue the environment is similar to the one considered at the beginning of this section, where we showed
that all rms choose the same capital structure and all banks choose simple portfolios.
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the repayment to the bank, other things being equal. Although diversication eliminates
idiosyncratic risk, the presence of idiosyncratic risk matters when there is default. Note
that in the rst two cases, the repayment function is increasing in a. In the third case, the
repayment function is independent of a. Also under the stated assumptions on F , both ` (a)
and `0 (a) are continuous.18
We proceed now to characterize the conditions under which bank equity is positive in
equilibrium. Let ab denote the smallest value of a  a0 such that ` (a)  d, that is, a bank
issuing debt d is solvent. Note that it will never be optimal for the bank to choose d > ` (a)
for all values of a, as that would mean that banks always default, which is suboptimal. Hence
ab is well dened and ab  a1. The bank will also be solvent for all a > ab, because ` (a) is
monotonically non-decreasing, as we noted above. Similarly, let af denote the smallest value
of a  a0 such that no rm defaults, that is, af  ` for all 0    1, or af  `=0. If
`=0  a1 then it is clear that af = `=0. Otherwise, af is not well dened and, in that case,
we set af =1 by convention. We then show the following:
Lemma 10 The equilibrium value of bank equity is positive if and only if ab < min faf ; a1g.
That is, bank equity has a positive value if the bank is solvent in more than one aggregate
state and defaults in fewer states than any rm. Using this result, we can show that it is
never optimal to have the value of bank equity equal to zero.
Proposition 11 If the bank technologies satisfy (15) and (16), all rms choose the same
capital structure, independently of the technology j, and banks lend equally to rms using
each technology, then the value of bank equity is strictly positive.
The proof shows that if bank equity were zero, a reduction in the face value of banks
debt, by reducing banksdefault costs always increases their market value. Hence in this
single factor environment, where diversication allows banks to reduce, but not completely
eliminate the risk in their portfolio, bank equity has a comparative advantage over rm
equity.
5 Conclusion
We have presented a classical model of competitive equilibrium in which banks act as inter-
mediaries between productive rms and consumers. Banks and rms raise funds by issuing
debt and equity. The Modigliani Miller Theorem does not hold in this environment for two
reasons. First, bank deposits o¤er liquidity services. Second, the use of debt can lead to
costly bankruptcy. As a result, the optimal capital structure, for a rm or bank, is deter-
minate in equilibrium. In this context, we have established analogues of the fundamental
theorems of welfare economics, showing that equilibria are constrained e¢ cient and that
constrained-e¢ cient allocations are decentralizable. Thus, equilibrium capital structures are
18See the proof of Proposition 11 in the appendix for a formal demonstration.
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privately and socially optimal: they maximize the market value of the rm or bank and they
are consistent with constrained e¢ ciency. The importance of the general equilibrium theory
is that it shows how markets coordinate the choice of capital structures, in the corporate
and banking sectors, so that risk and equity capital are optimally allocated between the two
sectors.
We have studied an environment in which the laisser-faire equilibrium is constrained
e¢ cient and there is no obvious need for capital adequacy regulation. Nonetheless, this may
be considered a rst step toward a theory of bank capital regulation. In the rst place, the
characterization of the constrained e¢ cient capital structures gives us some idea of what
capital adequacy regulation should lead to. In the second place, contrasting the conditions
under which laisser faire is constrained e¢ cient with the real world gives us a clue why market
failures occur. In particular, our assumption that perfect markets exist for all possible types
of debt and equity is quite demanding.
We alluded briey in the introduction to some of the justications for capital regula-
tion. Asymmetric information is one. Banks are opaque and depositors and equity holders
alike may have incomplete information about the risk characteristics of the banks portfo-
lio. Asymmetric information may give rise to moral hazard in the form of risk shifting and
asset substitution. The possibility of government bailouts in the event of default may also
encourage excessive risk taking. Externalities, whether pecuniary or real, may give rise to
costs that are not internalized by bankers.
Capital requirements may not be a panacea, however. Managersinterests are not aligned
with shareholdersinterests and, even if they are aligned, it is not clear that the top manage-
ment of the largest banks is aware of and able to control risk taking by highly incentivized
managers at lower levels. The nancial crisis provided us with many examples of high level
managers, holding large equity stakes in the bank, who were unaware of the dangers facing
their banks until the last minute.
We have also ignored a second motive for requiring a large capital bu¤er: bank capital
is part of total loss absorbtion capacity (TLAC), which reduces the need for politically
unpopular bailouts. Whether innovations such as TLAC and bail-inable debt will actually
put an end to bailouts is not clear, but capital regulation motivated by the desire to avoid
bailouts may look quite di¤erent from capital regulation motivated by moral hazard in risk
taking.
So, there is much to be done in order to develop a satisfactory microfoundation for
capital regulation. But the recognition that e¢ cient capital structures in the banking and
corporate sectors are interrelated and determined by general equilibrium forces is a rst-order
requirement for any sensible theory.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The proof is by contradiction. Suppose, contrary to what we want to prove, that (c; z;;)
is constrained ine¢ cient. Then there exists a feasible allocation (c; z;;) such that U (c) >
U (c). Condition (iii) of the denition of equilibrium implies that c lies outside the repre-
sentative consumers budget set. That is, q  z > 1, where
c = z  a =
X
h2H
 
zdha
d
h; z
e
ha
e
h

:
Now the equilibrium optimality condition for banks implies that
qdb + q
e
b  qdF  xb;
for any b 2 B. Then X
b2B
qdb z
d
b +
X
b2B
qeb z
d
b =
X
b2B
b
 
qdb + q
e
b


X
b2B
bq
d
F  x
=
X
f2F
fq
d
f
because attainability requires that zdb = z
e
b = b, for any b = (x; d) 2 B, and
P
b2B bxf = f ,
for any f 2 F .
Similarly, the equilibrium optimality condition for rms implies that
qdf + q
e
f  1;
for any f 2 F . But this implies that
q  z =
X
b2B
qdb b +
X
b2B
qeb b +
X
f2F
qef f

X
f2F
qdf f +
X
f2F
qef f

X
f2F
f = 1:
This contradicts our initial hypothesis and proves that the equilibrium allocation must be
e¢ cient.
Proof of Proposition 2
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Let C denote the set of attainable consumption vectors. Then the supporting hyperplane
theorem tells us that there exists a non-negative price vector p such that
p  c = sup fp  c : c 2 Cg :
Without loss of generality, we normalize prices so that p c = 1. Now dene the securities
prices q as follows:
qdb = p
   adb ;0 ;
qeb = p
  (0; aeb) ;
qef = p
   0;aef ; and
qdf = 1  qef :
For any (c;;) satisfying (11a) and (12a),
1 = p  c
 p  c
= p 
 X
b2B
b
 
adb ; a
e
h

+
X
f2F
f
 
0; aef
!
=
X
b2B
b
 
qdb + q
e
b

+
X
f2F
fq
d
f
=
X
b2B
b
 
qdb + q
e
b

+
X
b2B
bxb  qdF :
It follows from this inequality that, for any bank b, with portfolio x,
qdb + q
e
b + x  qdF  1;
=) qdb + qeb + x 
 
1  qdF
  1;
=) qdb + qeb   x  qeF  0:
In other words, no bank can earn positive prots. But active rms must earn zero prots in
equilibrium, because
1 = p  c
= p 
 X
b2B
b
 
adb ; a
e
h

+
X
f2F
f
 
0; aef
!
=
X
b2B
b
 
qdb + q
e
b

+
X
f2F
fq
e
f
=
X
b2B
b
 
qdb + q
e
b

+ 1 
X
f2F
fq
d
f
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so X
b2B
b
 
qdb + q
e
b
 X
f2F
fq
d
f = 0:
Then b > 0 implies q
d
b + q
e
b   x  qdF = 0.
By denition, we have
qdf + q
e
f = 1;
so all rms are value maximizing.
Finally, the optimality of the representative consumers choice follows from the fact that
U (c) > U (c) implies that p  c > p  c. Any portfolio z that generates a consumption
bundle c must therefore have a value greater than 1 because we have dened security prices
so that
q  z = p  c:
But this implies that z does not belong to the budget set fz : q  z  1g.
Proof of Proposition 4
In state s, the holders of equity in bank b = (x; d) receive
max
8<: X
f=(`;j)
f (s)xf min f`; Afsg   d; 0
9=;
units of consumption and the holders of deposits receive
b (s)min
8<:d; X
f=(`;j)
f (s)xf min f`; Afsg
9=;
units of consumption, where
f (s) =

1 if `  Ajs
f if ` > Ajs
and
b (s) =

1 if d Pf=(`;j) f (s)xf min f`; Ajsg
f if d >
P
f=(`;j) f (s)xf min f`; Ajsg
:
Let
`b =
X
f=(`;j)
xf`

denote the face value of the debt owed to bank b and let
`b (s) =
X
f=(`;j)
f (s)xf min f`; Ajsg
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denote the actual amount repaid to bank b in state s.
Step 1: The value of equity of all active banks is positive if and only if `b > d.
The dividends paid by the bank are non-negative in each state because of limited liability.
Then it is clear that the value of equity is strictly positive if and only if `b (s) > d in at
least one state s. Since default is costly, all active rms choose a debt level `  AfS and
all active banks a level of deposits d  `b. We claim that the value of equity of bank b is
positive if and only if `b > d. To see this, note rst that, if `b = d, the payment to equity
holders (as dened above) is zero in each state and, second, if `b > d, the payment must
be positive in state S at least, because in that state each rm f  repays the face value of its
debt, the bank receives `b and the equity holders receive `b (S)  d = `b   d > 0.
Step 2: For each f , there exists a state sf such that rm f  is solvent if and only if
s  sf. Similarly, for each b there exists a state sb such that bank b is solvent if and
only if s  sb.
A rm f  = (`; j) is insolvent in state s if and only if ` > Ajs. Let sf be the smallest
state such that f  is solvent. There must be such a state because the rm is solvent at least
in state S. The fact that Ajs is increasing in s implies that f  is solvent if and only if
s  sf.
Similarly, we can show that there is a state sb such that bank b is solvent if and only if
s  sb. Let sb denote the smallest state in which the bank is solvent. There must be such a
state because the bank is solvent at least in state S. It is clear that `b (s) is non-decreasing
in s because Ajs is increasing in s for every j and f (s) is non-decreasing in s, for every
f . Let
db (s) = b (s)min fd; `b (s)g
denote the payment to deposit holders in state s. Then it is clear that db (s) is non-decreasing
in s because `b (s) and b (s) are non-decreasing. From this observation it follows that the
bank is solvent if and only if s  sb.
Step 3: The face value of deposits satises d = `b (sb).
To prove this claim, we have to consider two cases. First, suppose that sb = 1; that is
bank b is solvent in every state, and d < `b (1).Then increasing d to d + " < `b (1), say,
will increase the payout to depositors by " in every state and reduce the payout to equity
holders by the same amount. This increases e¤ective consumption by (1  ) " in each state,
contradicting the constrained e¢ ciency of the equilibrium.
The second possibility is that sb > 1 and d < `b (sb). Suppose the bank increases
deposits by " > 0 to d + " < `b (sb). This will not have any e¤ect in states s < sb because
the bank is in default, depositors are receiving `b (s) < d and equity holders are receiving
nothing. In states s  sb, on the other hand, the net e¤ect will be an increase in e¤ective
consumption of (1  ) ". This again contradicts constrained e¢ ciency.
Step 4: Bank bs equity has no value: d = `b.
Suppose to the contrary that d = `b (sb) < `b. Then there must exist at least one rm
that is bankrupt in state sb. Otherwise, the rms repayment would be `b (sb) = `b.
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Suppose that rm f  = (`; j) is bankrupt in state sb and consider the e¤ect of reducing
the borrowing of f  by an amount " > 0 such that `   " = Ajsb . This change has no
impact on the viability of the bank in state sb because rm f  is now paying Ajsb in state
sb, instead of fAjsb . So the bank is solvent in states s  sb as before. Also, the change
does have an e¤ect on the solvency of the rm, as it is now solvent in state sb and hence in
all states s  sb.
Note that none of the payo¤s to the debt and equity of the bank or the rm change in
states s < sb. Moreover, there are no changes to the payo¤ to banks debt (deposits) in
states s  sb because the bank is solvent in all these states and hence pays d to depositors.
The changes in payo¤ a¤ect only the returns to equity in the states s  sb. Consider rst
the equity of the bank. In states s  sb, the payo¤ of banks equity will increase because
of the increase in the rms repayment, that is the change in the payo¤ of banks equity is
equal to
b;s =

Ajsb   fAjs if sb  s < sf
Ajsb   ` if sf  s
;
because the rm will pay Ajsb in each state and was previously paying fAjs in states
sb  s < sf and ` in states sf  s.
The return to the equity of rm f  is increased by Ajs Ajsb for all s  sb ; the change
in the rms equity is so
f;s =

Ajs   Ajsb if sb  s < sf
`   Ajsb if sf  s
:
The transfer between bank equity holders and rm equity holders has no e¤ect on total
consumption. The net increase in consumption is the sum of b;s and f;s, which is
b;s +f;s =

Afsb   fAjs + Ajs   Ajsb if sb  s < sf
Ajsb   ` + `   Ajsb if sf  s
=

Ajs   fAjs if sb  s < sf
0 if sf  s :
Thus, the net gain for equity holders is the saving in default costs (1  f)Ajs in the states
sb  s < sf. The possibility of such a gain contradicts the constrained e¢ ciency of the
equilibrium.
This completes the proof that bank equity has no value.
Proof of Proposition 6.
Banks holding risk free debt In the case of a bank holding only the debt of rms
with `j = aL, the portfolio x is indeterminate subject to the constraint
P
j x
L
j = 1. The
optimal capital structure for the bank is to issue the maximum amount of deposits, d = aL.
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The expected utility generated by the bank and the rms whose debt it holds will be
d+ " (aH   d) +  (aM   d) + (1     ") 

n  1
n
aM +
1
n
aL   d

= aL + " (aH   aL) +  (aM   aL) + (1     ") 

n  1
n
aM   n  1
n
aL

= aL + " (aH   aL) +

 + (1     ") n  1
n

 (aM   aL) :
Banks holding safe and risky debt Now suppose that the bank lends to a mixture
of safe and risky rms. We can focus here on the loans made by the bank to rms with
technology j but possibly di¤erent capital structures. Suppose that  units of capital are
invested in safe rms with `j = aL and 1    units of capital are invested in risky or very
risky rms, that is, rms that have a capital structure `j 2 faH ; aMg. There is no need
to distinguish safe rms according to the technology they use: from the point of view of
banks and shareholders, who hold their debt and equity, they are identical. Let xHj and
xLj denote the fraction of 1    invested in rms with technology j and `j equal to aH and
aM , respectively. Note that
Pn
j=1 a
H
j + a
M
j = 1 and that the amounts invested in rms with
technology j and `j equal to aH and aM are aHj (1  ) and aMj (1  ), respectively.
Suppose the bank chooses a level of deposits d. Since the safe banks pay aL for sure, the
bank will fail if and only if payment from the risky banks is less than d  aL. Now suppose
that we split the bank into two banks, one of which funds safe rms and the other funds
risky rms. The safe bank invests one unit in safe rms and issues deposits dS = aL and
the risky bank invests one unit in a portfolio

xHj ; x
M
j
	n
j=1
of risky rms and issues deposits
dR. The expected utility from the safe bank is denoted by US and the expected utility from
the risky bank is denoted by UR. What is the di¤erence between these two banks and the
combined bank we started with? Note that the risky bank will default if and only if the
unied bank defaults with a positive probability. If there is no probability of default, there is
no di¤erence in the expected utility generated by the two structures. On the other hand, if
there is a positive probability of default, the separated banks will generate a higher expected
utility, because the safe bank does not default whereas the combined bank does default in
some states. In fact, the gain in expected utility by separating the banks is precisely the
probability of default muliplied by the default cost (1  b) dSb .
Thus, either there is no gain from mixing safe and risky debt in the banks portfolio or, if
the mixture of safe and risky debt causes the bank to default with positive probabilty, there
is a loss.
Safe banks holding risky debt Now suppose that a bank chooses a portfolio x = 
xHj ; x
M
j ; 0
	n
j=1
where xHj is the measure of rms of type j with `j = aH , x
M
j is the measure
of rms of type j with `j = aM , and we assume that no rms with `j = aL are included. The
portfolio x has no impact in states s = n + 1; n + 2 because all technologies have identical
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payo¤s in these states. Now consider the states s = 1; :::; n and let j denote the repayment
of all rms when type j has productivity aL. Then
j =
X
i6=j
 
xHi f + x
M
i

aM +
 
xHj + x
M
j

faL:
Without essential loss of generality, we can order the types of rms so that j  j+1 for j =
1; :::; n  1. The bank wants to maximize the face value of deposits subject to the no-default
constraint d  1. To do that, it must choose a portfolio x such that
 
xHj ; x
M
j

=
 
0; 1
n

for
all j = 1; :::; n, that is, a simple portfolio. Having done so, the value of deposits it can safely
issue is
d =
n  1
n
aM +
1
n
faL:
The expected utility generated by the bank and the rms whose debt it holds will be
d+  (1     ")

n  1
n
aM +
1
n
faL   d

+  (aM   d) + " (aH   d)
= d+  (aM   d) + " (aH   d) :
Risky banks holding risky debt We split the analysis in two parts, considering rst
that case where d  aM and, second, the case where d > aM .
i) Suppose that there is a positive probability of the bank defaulting, but that d  aM .
This means that default only occurs in states s = 1; :::; n. As before, the portfolio x is
irrelevant in states s = n + 1; n + 2 so we restrict attention to the states s = 1; :::; n. With
our usual convention that j  j+1, there exists a technology k such that, d > j for
j = 1; :::; k and d  j for j = k + 1; :::; n. (The bank will never choose to default with
probability one). The expected utility of the banks depositors and shareholders will be
1
n
b
kX
j=1
j +
n  k
n
d+
1
n

nX
j=k+1
 
j   d
  1
n
b
kX
j=1
j +
n  k
n
d+
1
n
nX
j=k+1
 
j   d

=
1
n
b
kX
j=1
j +
1
n
nX
j=k+1
j;
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because  < 1. Now
1
n
b
kX
j=1
j =
1
n
b
kX
j=1
 X
i6=j
 
xHi f + x
M
i

aM +
 
xHj + x
M
j

faL
!
=
1
n
b
 
nX
j=k+1
 
xHj f + x
M
j

aM +
kX
j=1
 
xHj + x
M
j

faL
!
+
1
n
b
kX
j=2
 
xHj f + x
M
j

aM   1
n
b
kX
j=2
 
xHj + x
M
j

faL
+
1
n
b
kX
j=2
 X
i6=j
 
xHi f + x
M
i

aM +
 
xHj + x
M
j

faL
!
 1
n
b
 
nX
j=k+1
 
xHj f + x
M
j

aM +
kX
j=1
 
xHj + x
M
j

faL
!
+
1
n
kX
j=2
 
xHj f + x
M
j

aM   1
n
kX
j=2
 
xHj + x
M
j

faL
+
1
n
kX
j=2
 X
i6=j
 
xHi f + x
M
i

aM +
 
xHj f + x
M
j

faL
!
;
because b < 1 and
 
xHj f + x
M
j

aM 
 
xHj + x
M
j

faL,
=
1
n
b
 
nX
j=k+1
 
xHj f + x
M
j

aM +
kX
j=1
 
xHj + x
M
j

faL
!
+
1
n
kX
j=2
 X
i6=j
 
xHi f + x
M
i

aM +
 
xHj f + x
M
j

aM
!
=
1
n
b
 
nX
j=k+1
 
xHj f + x
M
j

aM +
kX
j=1
 
xHj + x
M
j

faL
!
+
k   1
n
nX
j=1
 
xHj f + x
M
j

aM :
35
Substituting this upper bound into the expression for expected utility, we obtain the inequal-
ity
1
n
b
kX
j=1
j +
1
n
nX
j=k+1
j
 1
n
b
 
nX
j=k+1
 
xHj f + x
M
j

aM +
kX
j=1
 
xHj + x
M
j

faL
!
+
k   1
n
nX
j=1
 
xHj f + x
M
j

aM
+
1
n
nX
j=k+1
 X
i6=j
 
xHi f + x
M
i

aM +
 
xHj + x
M
j

faL
!
 1
n
b
 
nX
j=k+1
 
xHj f + x
M
j

aM +
kX
j=1
 
xHj + x
M
j

faL
!
+ (1  b) 1
n
nX
j=k+1
 
xHj f + x
M
j

aM
  (1  b) 1
n
nX
j=k+1
 
xHj + x
M
j

faL +
k   1
n
nX
j=1
 
xHj f + x
M
j

aM
+
1
n
nX
j=k+1
 X
i6=j
 
xHi f + x
M
i

aM +
 
xHj + x
M
j

faL
!
=
1
n
b
 
nX
j=k+1
 
xHj + x
M
j

faL +
kX
j=1
 
xHj + x
M
j

faL
!
+
k   1
n
nX
j=1
 
xHj f + x
M
j

aM
+
1
n
nX
j=k+1
 X
i6=j
 
xHi f + x
M
i

aM +
 
xHj f + x
M
j

aM
!
because b < 1 and
Pn
j=k+1
 
xHj + x
M
j

faL <
Pn
j=k+1
 
xHj f + x
M
j

aM . So
1
n
b
kX
j=1
j +
1
n
nX
j=k+1
j
 1
n
b
 
nX
j=k+1
 
xHj + x
M
j

faL +
kX
j=1
 
xHj + x
M
j

faL
!
+
k   1
n
nX
j=1
 
xHj f + x
M
j

aM +
1
n
nX
j=k+1
 X
i6=j
 
xHi f + x
M
i

aM +
 
xHj f + x
M
j

aM
!
 1
n
bfaL +
k   1
n
aM +
n  k
n
aM =
1
n
bfaL +
n  1
n
aM ;
because
Pn
j=1
 
xHj f + x
M
j
  Pnj=1  xHj + xMj  = 1. But the last expression in this series
of inequalities is the representative consumers expected utility when the bank lends only to
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rms that use a single technology j and choose the capital structure ` = aM and the level of
deposits is d = aM . It is easy to check that for any other portfolio and face value of deposits
one of the inequalities is strict, so this is the unique policy that maximizes expected utility
in the states s = 1; :::; n when d  aM and the probability of default is positive.
Now let us check that this policy is optimal in the states s = n+ 1; n+ 2. The expected
utility in states s = n+ 1; n+ 2 is

 + "
aM +
"
 + "
(aM +  (aH   aM)) :
For any other portfolio
 
xHj ; x
M
j ; 0
	n
j=1
, the bank will be in default in state s = n + 1 ifPn
j=1 x
H
j > 0 and the expected utility in states s = n+ 1; n+ 2 is

 + "
b
 
nX
j=1
 
xHj f + x
M
j

aM
!
+
"
 + "
(aM +  (aH   aM)) <

 + "
aM +
"
 + "
(aM +  (aH   aM)) :
If
Pn
j=1 x
H
j = 0, the bank is not in default in either state and the payo¤ is

 + "
 
nX
j=1
xMj aM
!
+
"
 + "
(aM +  (aH   aM)) =

 + "
aM +
"
 + "
(aM +  (aH   aM))
Thus, the unique optimal policy is to set d = aM and xMj = 1 for some j as long as d  aM .
ii) Now consider the case in which d > aM . In that case, the bank always defaults
states s = 1; :::; n+ 1. In states s = 1; :::; n, the expected utility will be
1
n
nX
j=1
b
 X
i6=j
 
xHi f + x
M
i

aM +
 
xHj + x
M
j

faL
!
and in states s = n+ 1; n+ 2 it will be

 + "
b
nX
j=1
 
xHj f + x
M
j

aM +
"
 + "
(d+  (aH   d)) :
The choice of d will be the maximum that allows the bank to remain solvent in state s = n+2,
that is, d =
Pn
j=1
 
xHj aH + x
M
j aM

. Letting xH =
Pn
j=1 x
H
j and x
M =
Pn
j=1 x
M
j , we can
rewrite the expected utility as

 + "
b
 
xHf + x
M

aM +
"
 + "
(d+  (aH   db))
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in states s = n+ 1; n+ 2 and
b

n  1
n
 
xHf + x
M

aM +
1
n
faM

in states s = 1; :::; n. This expression is linear in
 
xH ; xM

, so at least one of the extreme
points
 
xH ; xM

= (0; 1) or
 
xH ; xM

= (1; 0) must be an optimum. Since we assume that
d > aM , this case is only observed if xH = 1.
Proof of Proposition 7.
As shown in the text, if the representative bank lends to safe rms (` = aL) the expected
utility is
aL +
n  1
n
 (aM   aL) :
If the representative bank issues safe debt (deposits) and lends to risky rms (` = aM), on
the other hand, the expected utility is
n  1
n
aM +
1
n
faL +
n  1
n
1
n
 (aM   faL) :
It is strictly optimal to issue safe debt and lend to risky rms if
aL +
n  1
n
 (aM   aL) < n  1
n
aM +
1
n
faL +
n  1
n
1
n
 (aM   faL) :
Multiplying by n
n 1 yields
n
n  1aL +  (aM   aL) < aM +
n
n  1faL +
1
n
 (aM   faL)
and collecting like terms gives us
n
n  1

1  1
n
f

aL   

1  1
n
f

aL <

1  n  1
n


aM
This can be rewritten as
n
n  1   

1  1
n
f

aL <

1  n  1
n


aM
which is equivalent to
n   (n  1)
n  1

1  1
n
f

aL <

n  (n  1) 
n

aM
or 
n  f
n  1

aL < aM :
Proof of Proposition 8
The argument in the proof of Proposition 6 left us with the following candidates for an
optimal bank policy.
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1. The bank invests in rms with ` = aL and d = aL. The rmstypes are irrelevant
because rm debt is risk free. The expected utility in equilibrium is
aL + 

(1     ")

n  1
n
aM +
1
n
aL

+ aM + "aH   aL

:
2a. The bank invests in rms with ` = aM . The portfolio is dened by xMj =
1
n
for all j and
the face value of deposits is d = n 1
n
aM +
1
n
faL. The expected utility in equilibrium
is
n  1
n
aM +
1
n
faL +  ( + ")


 + "
aM +
"
 + "
aH   n  1
n
aM   1
n
faL

2b. The bank invests in rms with ` = aM . The portfolio is dened by xMj = 1 for some j
and the face value of deposits is d = aM . The expected utility in equilibrium is
(1     ")b

n  1
n
aM +
1
n
faL+

+ ( + ") aM + " (aH   aM) :
3. The bank invests in rms with ` = aH . The portfolio is dened by xH = 1 (the
distribution over j is irrelevant) and the face value of deposits is d = aH . The expected
utility in equilibrium is
"aH + b

faM + (1     ")

n  1
n
faM +
1
n
faL

:
Suppose that  and " converge to zero. The expected utilities in the di¤erent cases
converge to
aL + 

n  1
n
aM   n  1
n
aL

; (Case 1)
n  1
n
aM +
1
n
faL; (Case 2a)
b

n  1
n
aM +
1
n
faL+

; (Case 2b)
and
bf

n  1
n
aM +
1
n
aL

; (Case 3)
respectively. Finally, Proposition 8 guarantees that Case 2a dominates Case 1. Thus, Case
2a dominates all other cases for values of  and " su¢ ciently close to zero.
Proof of Lemma 10
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We rst note that it is impossible to have ab > af , because this implies that d > ` (af ) = `,
that is, banks always default, which is suboptimal. This, together with the property ab  a1;
established in the text, shows that we always have ab  min faf ; a1g.
Proof. Su¢ ciency. Suppose that ab < min faf ; a1g. As shown in the proof of Proposition
11 ` (a) is strictly increasing on the interval [ab; af ] ; hence ` (a) > d on the interval (ab; a1],
so the value of bank equity is positive becauseZ a1
a0
max f` (a)  d; 0g dG =
Z a1
ab
(` (a)  d) dG > 0.
Necessity. If ab = af  a1, then d = ` (ab), ` (af ) = ` and d = `, so obviously bank
equity has zero value.
On the other hand, ab = a1  af implies that d = ` (a1), and the fact that ` (a) is
monotonically non-decreasing implies thatZ a1
a0
max f` (a)  d; 0g dG  max f` (a1)  d; 0g = 0.
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 11
By direct calculation, we show that ` (a) is strictly increasing when 0 < `a < 1:
`0 (a) = f
Z `=a
0
dF + f`F
0

`
a
  `
a2
  `F 0

`
a
  `
a2
= f
Z `=a
0
dF + (1  f )F 0

`
a

`
a
2
> 0:
Moreover,
lim
a!`=1
`0 (a) = f
Z 1
0
dF + (1  f )F 0 (1) (1)2 = f ;
lim
a!`=0
`0 (a) = (1  f )F 0 (0) (0)2 = 0
where the nal equalities follow from our assumption that
R 1
0
dF = 1 and that F 0 (0) =
F 0 (1) = 0. This shows that `0 (a) is continuous and well dened at `=a = 0 and `=a = 1.
Suppose that ab = af  a1. Note that, by the denition of af we have 0af = ` = `(af ),
while from the continuity of ` (a) we get ` (ab) = d. We show in what follows that a small
decrease in d to d0 (holding ` constant), corresponding to a decrease in ab to a0, always
increases bank prots. At a0 we have
d0 = `(a0) = f
Z `=a0
0
a0dF + `

1  F

`
a0

;
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and, by the property established above,
lim
a0!ab=`=0
`0(a0) = 0:
Consider then the market value of a bank with debt level d0 = ` (a0):
b
Z a0
a0
` (a) dG+ ` (a0) (1 G (a0)) + 
Z af
a0
(` (a)  ` (a0)) dG+ (`  ` (a0)) (1 G (af ))

:
Di¤erentiating with respect to a0 and evaluating the derivative at a0 = af yields
b` (a
0)G0 (a0) + `0 (a0) (1 G (a0))  ` (a0)G0 (a0)   (` (a0)  ` (a0))G0 (a0)
 
Z af
a0
`0 (a0) dG  `0 (a0) (1 G(af )   (`  ` (a0))G0 (af )
= b` (af )G
0 (af ) + `0 (af ) (1 G (af ))  ` (af )G0 (af )  `0 (af ) (1 G(af )   (`  ` (af ))G0 (af )
= (b` (af )  `  (1  ) ` (af ))G0 (af ) + (1  ) `0 (af ) (1 G (af ))
= (b   1) `G0 (af ) < 0;
because `0 (af ) = 0 and d = ` = ` (af ). Thus, a small decrease in d and ab holding ` constant
must increase the banks market value, contradicting the equilibrium conditions.
It remains to consider the case af > a1 so that `=a1 > 0 and ab = a1. In that case, the
banks debt level is any d  `(a1): The banks market value is
b
Z a1
a0
` (a) dG
If we consider again a marginal decrease of ab to a0 (equivalently, of d below `(a1)), its market
value changes as follows:
b
Z a0
a0
` (a) dG+ ` (a0) (1 G (a0)) + 
Z a1
a0
(` (a)  ` (a0)) dG:
Di¤erentiating again this expression with respect to a0 and evaluating then the derivative at
a0 = a1 yields:
b` (a
0)G0 (a0) + `0 (a0) (1 G (a0))  ` (a0)G0 (a0) 
 (` (a0)  ` (a0))G0 (a0) 
Z a1
a0
`0 (a0) dG
= b` (a1)G
0 (a1) + `0 (a1) (1 G (a1))  ` (a1)G0 (a1)
= (b` (a1)  ` (a1))G0 (a1) + `0 (a1) (1 G (a1))
= (b   1) ` (a1)G0 (a1) < 0;
In this case too, the banksmarket value can be increased by lowering d below `(a1), that
is, by having a positive value of equity.
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